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EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE LAW-How ARKANSAS'S NEW RULE OF
EVIDENCE CODIFIES "SELECTIVE WAIVER" OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT PROTECTION AND AN ARGUMENT FOR A
MORE MODERATE APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
When a corporation waives its attorney-client privilege to cooperate
with a government investigation into possible wrongdoing, is it thereby ex-
posed to litigation from third parties who would seek to use the disclosed
information in a private lawsuit? Bank of America recently took this risk
when it disclosed privileged documents to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in a federal lawsuit related to the bank's merger with
Merrill Lynch. One of the SEC's allegations was that the bank's leaders
knew about large losses at Merrill Lynch and sought to prove that the corpo-
ration wrongfully withheld this information from its shareholders.'
Bank of America gave the SEC access to documents prepared by its
counsel relating to the Merrill Lynch merger, expressing a desire to "fully
cooperate with all of the inquiries[,]" and asserting that it had "nothing to
hide." 2 Many corporate-law commentators speculated that the bank hoped
its disclosure would fall under the protection of the newly-enacted Federal
Rule of Evidence 502, concerning waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
One analyst, however, alleged that the bank misread the new rule by assum-
ing that, with a judge's consent, it could waive the privilege to the SEC
while continuing to maintain the privilege against third parties in civil cas-
es-some fifty-eight of which had been filed against the bank regarding the
matter at the time of disclosure.
The bank seems to have assumed that Federal Rule 502(d) allowed it to
"selectively waive" its privilege to the SEC while still retaining the privi-
lege against discovery by third parties. This might not, however, be the
case. Indeed, one of the drafters of Federal Rule 502 has pointed out that the
bank's attempt at selective waiver does not comport with 502(d).4 Notwith-
standing the new Federal Rule 502, voluntary disclosure of information
protected by attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product protection
1. Zach Lowe, Did BofA Mess Up Its Privilege Waiver?, THE AM. LAW DAILY (Oct.
17, 2009), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/10/did-bofa-screw-up-its-
privilege-waiver-.html.
2. Marie Leone, Bank ofAmerica Waives Attorney-Client Privilege, CFO.COM (Oct. 13,
2009), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14447248.
3. Zach Lowe, Parsing the BofA Privilege Waiver and its [sic] Impact on Wachtell,
Shearman, THE AM. LAw DAILY (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/10/parsing-the-bofa-privilege.html.
4. Gregory P. Joseph, Bank of America Privilege Waiver Order-Not Authorized by




results in a "general waiver" of that privilege in the majority of federal ju-
risdictions.s After any waiver of privileged or protected information, the
disclosing party may not seek to suppress the information in subsequent
*6litigation.
State rules of evidence usually lack provisions for situations like this.
The state of Arkansas, however, does allow clients to selectively disclose
privileged material to the government while still upholding the privilege
with respect to third parties. Arkansas recently established the doctrine of
"selective waiver" in a new provision in its Rules of Evidence, whereby
privileged information disclosed to the government retains its protection,
despite the breach of strict confidentiality. Arkansas has little case law on
the subject, and the state is the first in the nation to introduce the concept
into its rules. The Eighth Circuit, in which Arkansas lies, has embraced se-
lective waiver in its case law,8 yet even among that circuit's states, Arkan-
sas is the only one that has made the doctrine part of its state rules of evi-
dence.
This note discusses why both general and specific waiver are proble-
matic and argues for a more moderate approach. There are compelling poli-
cy considerations for allowing corporations to disclose privileged informa-
tion to the government without fear of legal reprisal from third parties, but
the policy implications for the attorney-client privilege are critical enough
that Arkansas should have taken less dramatic action. Instead, the state
should have endorsed selective waiver only where the waiving party and the
investigating agency have executed an agreement to maintain the confiden-
tiality of the information.
Part two of this note discusses Arkansas's new rule and contrasts it
with federal case law, which is split on the effects of waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection. 9 Part three examines the di-
lemma facing corporate clients and their counsel, placing particular empha-
sis on the internal policies of the SEC during an investigation into alleged
corporate wrongdoing.10 Part four compares the policy arguments behind
both selective waiver and the majority's general waiver rule." Part five
concludes the note by advocating for the approach suggested by the Second
5. Michael H. Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need for a New Look at Selective
Waiver in SEC Investigations, 89 MARQ. L. REv. 761, 761 (2006) ("[C]ourts-including the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits-have rejected selective
waiver, holding that waiver as to one generally is waiver as to all.").
6. Id.
7. ARK. R. EvID. 502(f.
8. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Circuit's dicta in In re Steinhardt Partners,12 whereby selective waiver
would exist only pursuant to the execution of a confidentiality agreement
between the parties to the initial waiver.13
II. ARKANSAS'S NEW RULE OF EVIDENCE AND ITS ORIGIN IN FEDERAL
CASE LAW
It is perhaps remarkable that Arkansas chose to amend its state rules of
evidence to introduce the controversial doctrine of selective waiver, as the
state has little case law pertaining to the issue. The new rule instead seems
influenced by the Eighth Circuit's minority position in the current federal
inter-circuit split. 14 To understand the concepts behind general and selective
waiver doctrines, one must consequently examine waiver under federal law,
which normally involves investigations by the SEC.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not purport to detail the actual scope
of the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product protection.
Though the newly amended Federal Rule 502 outlines some procedural
rules regarding the concepts, all privileges at the federal level remain "go-
verned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."" Ac-
cordingly, the case law of the various circuits shapes federal privilege waiv-
er law, and this case law is split.'6 While the Eighth Circuit has specifically
embraced the concept of selective waiver, the majority of federal jurisdic-
tions decline to accept the doctrine and commonly hold that any waiver is
inconsistent with further assertion of the privilege.' 7
A typical case that reflects the majority "general waiver" approach is
the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Pernian Corporation v. Unit-
ed States.'8 Appellee Permian was a subsidiary of Occidental Corporation, a
petroleum company involved in an SEC investigation related to an ex-
change of shares with another corporation.' 9 The SEC had not alleged any
wrongdoing by either party to this transaction, yet Permian requested the
SEC's approval so that the parties could complete the exchange more rapid-
12. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
13. See discussion infra Part V.
14. In re Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 and 26; Admin. Order No. 20; and R. Evid. 502, 372 Ark.
App'x 592, _ (2008) (per curiam).
15. FED.R.EVID. 501.
16. Dore, supra note 5, at 761.
17. Douglas R. Richmond, The Case Against Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Immunity, 30 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 253, 255 (2006) ("Courts
have generally rejected selective waiver.").
18. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. Id at 1215-16.
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ly. 2 0 In response, the SEC asked for certain documents to aid them in the
voluntary investigation-corporate documents falling variously under the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.2'
The SEC agreed to keep the documents confidential from any third
party, including any other governmental organizations that would seek to
discover them.22 The Department of Energy, conducting its own investiga-
tion to determine if Permian was in compliance with gas pricing regulations,
sought access to the same documents Permian had shared with the SEC.23
Permian balked, and sought an injunction in federal district court to bar the
SEC from releasing the documents to the Department of Energy. 24 The Dis-
trict Court enjoined release of the documents, but the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned that injunction, firmly rejecting Permian's argument
that the confidentiality agreement with the SEC allowed them to continue to
assert the privilege against third parties. 25 Stating that "[a]ny voluntary dis-
closure by the holder of such a privilege is inconsistent with the confidential
relationship and thus waives the privilege," the court declined to hold that
Permian could "selectively" waive the privilege.2 6
Permian is typical of federal waiver cases. The only federal jurisdic-
tion to explicitly disagree with this approach and embrace the doctrine of
selective waiver is the Eighth Circuit.27 In Diversified Industries v. Mere-
dith, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that documents "disclosed ...
in a separate and nonpublic SEC investigation" were disclosed under a "li-
mited waiver of the privilege."28
In Diversified, a corporate plaintiff-Weatherhead-brought suit
against Diversified Industries, Inc., alleging a conspiracy to bribe Weather-
head employees to purchase "large amounts of inferior copper" from Diver-
sified.29 Diversified had hired outside counsel to conduct an internal inves-
tigation into the matter, and had disclosed the results of this investigation to
the SEC.30 Weatherhead sought to discover the material in the report that
was disclosed to the SEC.31 The court of appeals initially found that when
Diversified volunteered these materials to the SEC, the corporation effected
a complete waiver of both the attorney-client privilege and work-product
20. Id. at 1215.
21. Id. at 1216.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1217.
24. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
25. Id. at 1222.
26. Id. at 1219 (citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
27. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (1978) (en banc).
28. Id. at 611.
29. Id at 600.
30. Id. at 600-01.
31. Id at 600.
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protection.32 Upon an en banc rehearing, however, the court reversed its
initial stance.33 Delving more deeply into the policies behind the attorney-
client privilege and again noting that the SEC investigation was "nonpub-
lic," the court held that the documents sought by Weatherhead were still
protected against discovery in the Weatherhead litigation.34
One federal court has embraced, at least in dicta, a third approach. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.,
refused to adopt either the majority's general waiver or the Eighth Circuit's
selective waiver rules.35 Though the actual disposition of the case was simi-
lar to a majority general waiver decision, commentators have treated the
decision as a third alternative to answering the waiver question. 36 A corpo-
rate defendant, Steinhardt Partners, had voluntarily disclosed protected at-
torney work-product to the SEC.37 Steinhardt sought to assert the protection
for the same documents in a subsequent class action lawsuit.38 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the disclosure to the SEC constituted a
voluntary waiver, characterizing Steinhardt's litigation strategy as little
more than "another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated
to gain tactical or strategic advantage." 9 Despite the disposition of the case
at bar, the court noted disapproval of the majority's general waiver ap-
proach.40 Asserting that "a rigid rule would fail to anticipate situations in
which the SEC and the disclosing party have entered into an explicit agree-
ment that the SEC will maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed mate-
rials," the court declined to adopt a "per se rule that all voluntary disclo-
sures to the government waive work product protection." 4 1
At the state level, few jurisdictions have defined the scope of privilege
law in rules of evidence. Arkansas, however, is an exception. Arkansas Rule
of Evidence 502 states that "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communica-
tions made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client [between the client or his representative and the attor-
32. Id. at 604.
33. Diversified, 572 F.2dat 611.
34. Id.
35. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
36. Jody E. Okrzesik, Note, Selective Waiver: Should the Government Be Privy to Privi-
leged Information Without Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doc-
trine?, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 115, 145-46 (2003) ("This implies that the Second Circuit may
recognize selective waiver with a confidentiality agreement, especially if the parties could
show that the relationship is non-adversarial.").
37. Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 231.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 235.




ney and/or his representative]." 42 Arkansas's rule also codifies the doctrine
of "selective waiver," stating that
[d]isclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-
client privilege or the work-product doctrine to a governmental office or
agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement au-
thority does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in fa-
vor of non-governmental persons or entities.43
The newly amended rule has not been particularly controversial at a
local level, as it merely echoed the Eighth Circuit's selective waiver rule in
Diversified. Upon approving the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on
Civil Practice's proposed rule, which became Arkansas Rule of Evidence
502, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the rule's codification of
Diversified' s selective waiver approach." The court also noted that the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee on Evidence had proposed a similar codification
of this minority approach to the Federal Rules.4 5 This seems to have reflect-
ed a misguided belief that the minority approach of Diversified was soon to
become federal law.
The proposed version of Federal Rule 502 that would have allowed se-
lective waiver, however, proved too controversial at a national level to make
it into the federal rules.46 Though the currently enacted version of Federal
Rule 502 deals with inadvertent disclosure and the validity of an intentional
waiver in a state proceeding for federal trial purposes, the rule as enacted
does nothing to codify either general or selective waiver. The United States
Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules agrees that
selective waiver should be introduced into the federal rules, asserting that,
"[a] rule protecting selective waiver in these circumstances furthers the im-
portant policy of cooperation with government agencies, and maximizes the
effectiveness and efficiency of government investigations."4 7 After the fail-
42. ARK. R. EVID. 502(b).
43. ARK. R. EvID. 502(f).
44. In re Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 and 26; Admin. Order No. 20; and R. Evid. 502, 372 Ark.
App'x 592, _ (2008) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Advisory Committee Modifies Proposed Evidence Rule 502 in Light ofPublic Com-




47. Letter from Jerry E. Smith, Chair Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon.
David F. Levi, Chair Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rep. of the Advi-
sory Comm. on Evidence Rules, May 15, 2006 (Rev. June 30, 2006) (on file with author).
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ure of this proposed amendment, there is little possibility that the federal
circuit split will change in the near future.
III. THE DILEMMA FACING CORPORATIONS IN A SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION
A corporation's motives in disclosing privileged information are im-
portant in order to understand the implications of waiver; so, a consideration
of what actually happens in a typical government investigation is informa-
tive. Though Bank of America's recent waiver dilemma occurred during
actual litigation with the SEC, most case law on the topic involves investi-
gations conducted prior to the filing of actual criminal charges. The SEC,
working in tandem with the Department of Justice (DOJ), investigates cor-
porations accused or suspected of wrongdoing and determines whether to
bring federal criminal charges. 48 Depending on whom one asks in the corpo-
rate community, one gets a varied picture of the actual machinations of an
SEC investigation. The history of the administrative procedures that lawyers
and government investigators use in these investigations demonstrates that
the government is not blind to the implications that waiver has on continued
assertions of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection for
subsequent litigation.4 9
Of course, even without government involvement, corporations often
conduct internal investigations when circumstances indicate wrongdoing or
failure to comply with the law. These investigations allow the corporation to
assess its own criminal and civil liability, remedy the problem, and prepare
for potential litigation from the government or private parties.so In an SEC
investigation, the Commission often seeks access to the results of these in-
ternal corporate investigations to help determine criminal liability.5
These investigations typically begin when the SEC learns of a possible
violation of federal securities law. 52 At this point, officials choose whether
to conduct an informal inquiry that involves a broad exploration of the
background information and circumstances of the issues warranting investi-
gation.5 3 Investigators often use this stage in the investigation to informally
48. See generally Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings:
Strategic Considerations for When the Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1143
(1999) (outlining the general process of an SEC investigation).
49. SEC Review of Enforcement Remedies, Proposed Legislation on Administrative
Proceedings, FOIA Privilege, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 456, 461 (Mar. 2, 1984) (ex-
pressing the SEC's concern that investigated corporations withhold privileged information in
government investigations due to fear of potential civil litigation).
50. Richmond, supra note 17, at 253-54.
5 1. Id.




interview relevant agents and employees of the corporation.54 This is the
SEC's first opportunity to contact the corporation's general counsel and,
accordingly, its first opportunity to request a privilege waiver.5 Hesitance
by the general counsel to respond to a document request issued pursuant to
one of these informal inquiries may result in an escalation of this process to
a formal inquiry. Consequently, while cooperation with the government at
this stage in the game is voluntary, cooperation could mean the difference
between termination of the investigation or escalation to more formal and
adversarial scrutiny from the SEC.57
Once the SEC makes the decision to begin a formal investigation-a
power delegated to it under section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act-
the agency's full subpoena power comes into play. As the DOJ controls
who is prosecuted, the Office of the Attorney General occasionally issues
formal memoranda outlining the procedures whereby the SEC demands or
requests privileged information.5 9 Often, congressional action or other cur-
rent events cause the DOJ to publicly amend these policies.
For example, in the late 1990s, then Deputy Attorney General (and
current Attorney General in the Obama administration) Eric Holder, Jr. is-
sued a memorandum now commonly known as the "Holder Memo."60 The
Holder Memo, while not sanctioning a demand of information protected by
the privilege, nevertheless listed waiver of the privilege as a factor the pros-
ecutor could consider when deciding whether to bring formal charges
against a corporation.61
In 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty issued the "McNulty
Memo," which changed the policies of the "Holder Memo" to some ex-
tent.62 McNulty's new procedures dictated that the DOJ could no longer
request a waiver of privileged information without showing "a legitimate
need for the privileged information to fulfill [the Department's] law en-
forcement obligations."63 This determination would depend on several fac-
tors, including "the collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver"-




58. Ferrara & Khinda, supra note 48, at 1148-49, 1154-55.
59. See, e.g., Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Paul J. McNulty on Principles of
Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter The McNulty Memo], available
at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnultymemo.pdf.
60. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Eric H. Holder on Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corp. (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter The Holder Memo], available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.pdf.
61. Id. at 8.
62. See generally The McNulty Memo, supra note 59.
63. The Holder Memo, supra note 60, at 8.
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ostensibly the possibility of exposure to litigation by third parties. These
newer policies retreated from the methods sanctioned by the "Holder
Memo," yet the policies still allowed the SEC to consider waiver in its as-
sessment of a corporation's cooperation.
Administrative policies that encroach upon the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection are generally met with resistance from Con-
gress.M Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania has been particularly vocal
about the threat the attorney-client privilege faces from SEC and DOJ inves-
tigations. In 2008, in response to the "McNulty Memo," Specter sponsored
a bill, later named the Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2009, that sought to
protect the privilege against waiver requests by the government." The bill
argues that
[d]espite the existence of numerous investigative tools that do not im-
pact the attorney-client relationship, the Department of Justice and other
agencies have increasingly created and implemented policies that tend to
undermine the adversarial system of justice, such as encouraging organi-
zations to waive attorney-client privilege and work product protections
to avoid indictment or other sanctions.67
Specter's bill purports to end government elicitation of privileged in-
formation in investigations by placing limits on the government's ability to
request or coerce this information from corporations. 8 The Attorney-Client
Privilege Act would prevent government agencies from demanding or even
requesting that a corporate entity reveal privileged or protected information,
a practice the bill characterizes as an "encroach[ment] on the constitutional
rights and other legal protections of employees." 6 9 The Act would also for-
bid the government from offering favorable treatment to the corporation for
voluntary disclosure or from threatening "adverse treatment or penal[ty]" if
70the corporate entity refuses to voluntarily waive the privilege.
After Specter introduced his bill in 2008, Deputy Attorney General
Mark R. Filip amended the DOJ's policies to answer congressional con-
cerns.7 1 During the debate over Specter's bill, Filip appeared in the Senate
64. DOJ's McNulty Memo in Evaluating Corporate Cooperation Is No Longer DOJ
Policy, FULCRUM INQUIRY (July 2008), available at http://fulcrum.com/DOJ-McNulty.htm.
65. See id.
66. See id.




71. Julie R. O'Sullivan, Does DOJ's Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the Rationales
Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A Preliminary "No,"
45 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1237, 1274 (2008).
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in 2008 to discuss changes he planned to make at the DOJ.72 In a 2008 letter
to Specter's Committee on the Judiciary, Filip outlined a new approach
whereby the DOJ would measure corporate cooperation by the "extent to
which a corporation discloses relevant facts and evidence, not [by] its waiv-
er of privileges." The new procedures would bar the government from
demanding that a corporate entity waive the attorney-client privilege. 74 Fi-
lip's approach did not go as far as the Protection Act, however, as the gov-
ernment would still be free to request a waiver in a corporate investiga-
tion.7 5 Filip's concessions led to tabling the 2008 version of the Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act, but Specter nevertheless reintroduced the
bill in February of 2009 and continues to argue that only a legislative solu-
tion to waiver requests will adequately protect the privilege and protec-
tion.76
Specter's reservations are not without merit. Even the amended poli-
cies outlined in the Filip Letter do not help a corporation decide whether to
voluntarily waive the privilege. Current policies measuring cooperation by a
corporation's "disclos[ure] of relevant facts and evidence"7 7 essentially fa-
vor a corporation that chooses to waive the privilege, despite the attempt to
placate those in Congress who would argue that the SEC is too intrusive.
The fact that the cooperation is measured by disclosure of facts, rather than
by a waiver of the privilege, offers little comfort to a corporation that wish-
es to disclose facts covered by the privilege. A corporate client seeking to
predict the consequences of waiver can expect little guidance from current
DOJ policies. Under current case law, the disclosure of these facts will con-
stitute a privilege waiver regardless of whether the government explicitly
requests one. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where a corporation
must waive in fact, if not in name.
72. Id. at 1273.
73. Letter from Deputy Att'y Gen. Mark Filip to Sen. Patrick Leahy and Sen. Arlen
Specter (July 9, 2008) [hereinafter The Filip Letter], available at
http://www.gibsondunn.con/publications/Documents/FilipLetter07O9O8.pdf.
74. O'Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1274.
75. The Filip Letter, supra note 73, at 2.
76. S. 445, I11th Cong. (2009).
77. O'Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1274.
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IV. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SELECTIVE WAIVER
OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT
PROTECTION
A. Examining the Majority's General Waiver Rule
There is no shortage of commentary and case law explaining the policy
concepts behind the majority's general waiver rule. Advocates of general
waiver principally stress that selective waiver does not further the underly-
ing policies of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.78
These commentators characterize the tactical advantage wielded by corpora-
tions allowed to selectively waive the privilege as unfair.79 This section will
examine the arguments for and against the majority rule.
1. The Arguments for General Waiver
Judges endorsing the majority's general waiver approach-and the
commentators supporting this rule-repeatedly stress the fundamental poli-
cy reasons behind the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn Co. v. United
States80 clarified the scope of the attorney-client privilege for corporations,
explaining that
[i]ts purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between at-
torneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recog-
nizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully in-
formed by the client. 1
Those commentators and courts supporting general waiver argue that
allowing clients to selectively waive the privilege to the government while
still asserting it against third parties does nothing to further this policy.82
This argument counsels that a general waiver rule is preferable because se-
lective waiver allows corporate clients to use the privilege as a litigation
78. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991)
("[S]elective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's attor-
ney in order to obtain informed legal assistance[]").
79. Richmond, supra note 17, at 284.
80. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
81. Id. at 389.
82. See Richmond, supra note 17, at 281 (arguing that "[t]he attorney-client privilege
has never been intended to ensure full disclosure to the government.").
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tactic, a practice often characterized as a "sword and shield."83 That is, cor-
porate clients can disclose privileged information when the disclosure
would operate to their advantage, such as when cooperating with a govern-
ment investigation, and still assert the attorney-client privilege when this
waiver would be a disadvantage, such as in litigation with third parties.
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed this criticism of selective waiver.
Stating that "[t]he decision to enter into settlement negotiations, and to dis-
close otherwise confidential information in the process, is a tactical one[,]"
this circuit rejected continued assertion of the privilege in In re Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litigation.8 ' Though the court
found that clients seeking this approach were "rational," the court also ob-
served that those clients' goals did not coincide with the policy objectives
behind the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.86
Courts rejecting the Eighth Circuit's approach have argued that Diver-
sified's "sole justification .. . was to encourage corporations to undertake
internal investigations."8 Emphasizing that the minority approach does not
serve the underlying policy rationales of the attorney-client privilege, courts
advocating general waiver allege that selective waiver would allow corpora-
tions to tactically avoid litigation, even though the previous disclosure was
made for "entirely different purposes."88
Arguing that the minority rule limits full disclosure of the truth, crit-
ics of selective waiver reject the argument that it allows for more efficient
truth finding in government investigations.90 This argument carries little
weight, they assert, as the increased truth finding in the government investi-
gation comes at the expense of the truth-finding province of the courts. 9'
2. The Arguments Against General Waiver
Critics of general waiver assert that the failure to further the policies of
the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection is not tantamount
to usurping them. The "sword and shield" criticism characterizes the dis-
closing party's reliance on selective waiver as a tactical tool, a "sword" that
they can use to their advantage in the current SEC investigation and a
83. Id. at 284.
84. Id.
85. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
86. Id. at 305-06.
87. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991).
88. Id.
89. Richmond, supra note 17, at 265.
90. Columbia, 293 F.3d at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
91. See Richmond, supra note 17, at 288 (noting that "civil litigation often yields more
meaningful results than related criminal prosecutions").
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"shield" that they can wield in subsequent litigation.9 2 The party attempting
to discover protected material in private litigation, however, is also using
the previous disclosure as a tactical tool. Tactical advantages, even those
that are objectively "unfair," are not anathema to the practice of law. The
ability to identify and exploit a tactical advantage is an admirable quality in
an attorney. An argument that selective waiver gives corporate defendants
an unfair advantage in later litigation ignores the similar advantage plaintiffs
have in a general waiver jurisdiction.
The work-product doctrine is said to "promote the adversary system by
safeguarding the fruits of an attorney's trial preparations from the discovery
attempts of the opponent" 93 by "establish[ing] a zone of privacy for strategic
litigation planning and to prevent one party from piggybacking on the ad-
versary's preparation. "9 Critics of selective waiver argue that a rule like
Diversified's does not further this policy.9' General waiver, though, does not
serve this policy any more significantly. The tactical advantage gained by a
plaintiff allowed to disclose generally waived work product permits that
plaintiff to piggyback on the government agency's work at the expense of
the corporate defendant.
The "shield and sword" argument also implies that corporate clients
are choosing to disclose their materials to one "adversary" (the government)
and shield themselves from discovery by another (third-party plaintiffs).
Characterizing the government as an adversary, however, presupposes en-
tirely opposing motives of the government and of corporations. Though the
parties' motives would rarely be completely harmonious (to be fair, the
government has the motive of maintaining securities laws and protecting the
public, while a corporation has its own bottom line to consider), their mo-
tives often overlap when it comes to remedying wrongdoing and protecting
shareholders.
Advocates of general waiver recoil at any suggestion that the govern-
ment and its investigative target are anything less than adversaries. In his
article "The Case Against Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work Product Immunity," Douglas Richmond argues that the concept
of a corporation and the government sharing the interest of compliance with
the law would rub out all boundaries between them. Indeed, all members of
the public have a common interest with the government in the company's
lawful behavior. This simply is not the type of common interest that the
92. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The
client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents.. . . The attorney-client
privilege is not designed for such tactical employment.").
93. Id. at 1219 (citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
94. Richmond, supra note 17, at 282 (citing United States v. Aldman, 68 F.3d 1495,




common interest exception to the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine was intended to protect.96
Though the respective motives of government and corporation might
diverge in some respects once a full SEC investigation has commenced, the
corporation's primary motive in an internal investigation is similar to the
one the government will later have-determining whether wrongdoing oc-
curred.97 The assertion that the parties here could never be anything less
than adversaries is something of an oversimplification, as the Steinhardt
dicta suggests.98 Furthermore, it retroactively imputes the corporation's mo-
tives in a government investigation to its motives in an internal investiga-
tion. While corporate counsel does investigate the possibility of civil and
criminal liability when conducting internal investigations, the primary goal
is truth finding.99 This motive is similar to the government's in an investiga-
tion, and the adversarial characterization is only partly accurate.
B. Examining the Minority's Selective Waiver Rule
As the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Diversified has little companion law,
most of the commentary supporting selective waiver comes from secondary
legal authority. In addition to the desirability of cooperation with the gov-
ernment in their investigative and law enforcement capacities, commenta-
tors note that "[t]he absence of selective waiver deprives government agen-
cies of potentially valuable information that could otherwise assist them in
the enforcement of applicable laws."' 00 Advocates of selective waiver con-
tend that the doctrine puts private litigants in no worse a position than they
would be in without it'o' and encourages corporations to conduct internal
investigations.10 2 Finally, selective waiver advocates maintain that when
corporations voluntarily disclose privileged information, this disclosure
mitigates the costs of government investigations to taxpayers. 03 This sec-
tion examines the arguments for the Eighth Circuit's selective waiver rule.
96. Id. at 282-83.
97. See Andrew J. McNally, Comment, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging
Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing by Restricting Third Party Access to Dis-
closed Materials, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 823, 857 (2005) (analogizing the corporation's
motive in sharing privileged information with the government as seeking legal advice).
98. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the Steinhardt court's hesitance to adopt
general waiver because the possibility of converging government and corporate goals).
99. See generally Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver of
Privilege Viable?, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2003 (discussing the motives of corporations conducting
internal investigations).
100. McNally, supra note 97, at 850.
101. Id. at 851.
102. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
103. McNally, supra note 97, at 850.
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1. The Arguments for Selective Waiver
Selective waiver advocates argue that general waiver will cause corpo-
rations to cease conducting internal investigations.'" One of the policy rea-
sons the Eighth Circuit emphasized in Diversified was that assuring corpo-
rate clients that the results of its internal investigations would be safe in the
government's hands would encourage corporations to continue these inves-
tigations. 05 Again, many of the facts ascertained in SEC investigations were
originally discovered in these internal investigations, and the Diversified
court argued that general waiver would result in corporations choosing not
to conduct their own internal investigations for fear of subsequent legal re-
percussions. 0 6 The court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise may have the
effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ in-
dependent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect
stockholders, potential stockholders and customers."07
Selective waiver advocates also contend that the minority rule puts
third-party plaintiffs in no worse a situation than they would be without the
disclosure to the government.108 Internal SEC policies also support this
principle:
The Commission also finds that preserving the privilege or protection
for internal reports shared with the Commission does not harm private
litigants or put them at any kind of strategic disadvantage. At worst, pri-
vate litigants would be in exactly the same position that they would have
been in if the Commission had not obtained the privileged or protected
materials. 09
Finally, general waiver seems unfair to those corporations not yet
found to have violated any law. While the basic concept of "fairness" re-
quires that a corporation guilty of criminal activity should not be able to
pick and choose how it faces the repercussions of its actions, an SEC inves-
tigation might not necessarily lead to penalties, criminal convictions, or
even charges. General waiver could have the result of exposing innocent
corporate parties to civil litigation as a natural result of their good-faith co-
operation.
104. Okrzesik, supra note 36, at 155-56 (noting that when "the burden of exposing a
company's Achilles heel to a flood of adversaries is certain, corporations will be less likely
to choose to disclose work product to the SEC").
105. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. McNally, supra note 97, at 851.
109. SEC Implementation of Standards of Prof'1 Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296, 6312 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
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One needs only to look at some of the relevant cases decided using the
majority's general waiver approach to see that this effectis not far-fetched.
In some of the most cited cases on point, the government had not yet com-
pleted its investigation when third parties sought to discover the information
disclosed to the authorities."o Sometimes the third party litigation has been
ongoing before the government's involvement, and the third parties simply
seek to discover the disclosed information to boost the strength of their own
cases.11
2. The Arguments Against Selective Waiver
There is little authority to support the suggestion that selective waiver
increases the transparency and efficiency of government investigations.
Though there may be some ambiguity over the distinction between requests
of waiver or requests for disclosure of the underlying facts that might re-
quire a waiver, even an effective waiver is not the only indicator of coopera-
tion with an investigation and is not the only way to accelerate the process.
The government may also gauge cooperation by factors such as the corpora-
tion's corrective activity and prior record of wrongdoing.112
Commentator Douglas Richmond argues that the Diversified court is
mistaken and contends that, "despite courts' nearly uniform hostility to cor-
porate attempts to invoke selective waiver and their repeated rejection of it
in published opinions," the negative consequences of waiver have not led
corporations to discontinue internal investigations.1 13 In fact, Richmond
argues the opposite-that selective waiver would have the perverse result of
actually limiting disclosure in internal investigations. 14 This is essentially
an argument that selective waiver eliminates a reason to withhold informa-
tion from the government. Without fear of third party legal consequences,
corporations have less of an excuse to keep quiet during an investigation. As
a result, their choice whether to disclose or maintain the privilege becomes
meaningless.
However, Richmond's argument overlooks the fact that after the
Eighth Circuit decided Diversified, participation in the SEC's Voluntary
Disclosure Program increased markedly-ostensibly due to the perception
that Diversified would result in a sea change in privilege waiver law."t5 The
110. In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1993).
111. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
112. The McNulty Memo, supra note 59, at 8.
113. Richmond, supra note 17, at 275.
114. Id. at 280-81 (arguing that "selective waiver signals strongly to corporate officers
and employees that communicating honestly and openly with the company's lawyers may
lead to their indictment or ruinous civil liability.").
115. McNally, supra note 97, at 840.
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argument that selective waiver might force a corporate client to conceal
information from their counsel for fear of later disclosure to the government
seems rational, but proponents of this argument offer very little research
into corporate behavior to support their assertions. Perhaps this is unders-
tandable, as a corporation is not likely to keep records of what is not dis-
closed to counsel. While it is conceivable that selective waiver could cause
some corporate clients to conceal information from their attorneys, there is
little concrete evidence of this behavior in the corporate community.
V. ADVOCATING THE MIDDLE GROUND APPROACH OF INRE STEINHARDT
PARTNERS: SELECTIVE WAIVER PURSUANT ONLY TO A CONFIDENTIALITY
AGREEMENT
This writer ultimately finds the argument for selective waiver more
persuasive. Proponents of the majority's approach argue that selective
waiver creates an unfair tactical advantage for corporations in subsequent
litigation and stress this advantage as abhorrent to fundamental concepts of
justice. They nevertheless fail to acknowledge the similar tactical advantage
that third party litigants stand to gain as a result of these investigations.
General waiver proponents argue that the policies behind the work-product
protection and attorney-client privilege are not "furthered" by allowing se-
lective waiver, but these arguments presuppose wrongdoing, an adversarial
relationship between the government and the investigated party, and a rela-
tionship between government and subsequent litigant that approaches some-
thing like privity. The arguments for selective waiver speak more toward
fundamental fairness and the practicality of compliance with a government
investigation. In addition, there is evidence that a climate of selective waiv-
er would result in more disclosure to the government.116
Nevertheless, the effect that selective waiver has on the privilege is not
so slight that the arguments for general waiver should be entirely set aside.
Selective waiver might not completely subvert the privilege, but it would at
least change the privilege's nature. Some commentators have argued for a
solution involving mandatory disclosure in all circumstances on the condi-
tion that no such disclosure to the government would constitute a waiver as
to third parties.' 17 Still others argue for the creation of a completely new
"corporation-government" privilege, a solution that would ostensibly swal-
low the entire waiver debate." 8
116. Id.
117. See generally Matthew Altemeier, Note, Rethinking Selective Waiver: The Argu-
ment for Mandatory Disclosure, 28 REv. LITIG. 629 (2009).
118. McNally, supra note 97, at 861-62 (arguing that "[s]elective waiver should . . . be
recognized as a new evidentiary privilege, a corporation-government privilege, rather than a
mere extension of existing privileges").
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The threat that mandatory disclosure would present toward the very
nature of the attorney-client privilege counsels against its implementation.
Efficacy of the program aside, one need only look at the controversy sur-
rounding the SEC/DOJ's "Voluntary Disclosure Program" to predict how
popular a "Mandatory Disclosure Program" would be."'9 Similarly, creation
of a new privilege would most likely need to be done at the case law level,
and implementation would be problematic at best if the debate over selec-
tive waiver is any indication of the markedly opposing opinions legal scho-
lars have over privilege policy.
The federal circuit split demonstrates that it is unrealistic to expect
courts to change evidence law so drastically. Judges are bound to construe
evidentiary rules narrowly,120 and there is no provision for waiver under the
current federal rules. Without guidance from an evidentiary rule, courts are
forced to rely on the common law. This is one of the reasons for the current
federal split. The memos issued by the DOJ show that administrative proce-
dures are vague and malleable. So long as selective waiver is exclusively a
creature of case law, courts will be free to interject whichever policy argu-
ment they find most appropriate to the disposition of the case at hand. Writ-
ing an exception to waiver law into the rules ensures that selective waiver
actually becomes law.
Indeed, codification in an official rule of evidence is a more graceful
way to effect change. Arkansas's decision to resolve the problem through its
Rules of Evidence makes sense, as looking to administrative agencies or
courts for the solution has proven puzzling, if not futile. The state chose the
right method to implement change in privilege-waiver law; however, the
state chose to introduce the bright-line rule of Diversified, where it should
have, instead, made selective waiver the rule only pursuant to a confiden-
tiality agreement between the client and the government agency.
After considering the arguments for general and .selective waiver, the
position of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Steinhardt is more un-
derstandable. The decision to "decline to adopt a per se rule that all volunta-
ry disclosures to the government"'21 waive the privilege acknowledges that
neither side's argument is so persuasive that the other's should be complete-
ly rejected. Both general waiver and selective waiver advocates address
relevant policy concerns, and a solution that attempts to meet the parties
halfway is the most logical choice.
119. Compare McNally, supra note 97, at 840 (arguing that the opinion in Diversified v.
Meredith increased corporate participation in the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program), with
Richmond, supra note 17, at 280 (arguing that selective waiver will decrease voluntary dis-
closure since corporations will not be able to hide behind the threat of private litigation).
120. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
121. In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1993).
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The most pragmatic legislative middle-ground approach is to introduce
a rule of evidence allowing selective waiver only pursuant to a confiden-
tiality agreement between the initial parties to the disclosure. The Steinhardt
court acknowledged that the possibility of confidentiality agreements and
common interests between government and corporation counseled against
general waiver.12 2 The court nonetheless also acknowledged that the diffi-
cult choice a disclosing party faces in an investigation should not lead to a
complete, "rigid" selective waiver exception to the privilege.123
Arkansas's version of selective waiver in Rule 502 takes federal law
created as a response to federal SEC litigation and applies it to any "gov-
ernment office or agency" to which a party might waive the privilege and
protection.124 The current federal split is informed almost entirely by cases
involving SEC investigations, which entail idiosyncratic procedures and
have implications primarily at the federal level. It is odd to apply the excep-
tion to all state government agencies based on the policies outlined in these
particularized federal procedures. A state agency large enough to deal with
investigations analogous to the SEC's would likely employ confidentiality
agreements in response to waiver requests like these. Allowing the excep-
tion only pursuant to an express agreement would allow courts to deal with
many smaller cases individually, implementing the policies of the Eighth
Circuit without drastically changing evidence law for all litigants.
When parties execute a confidentiality agreement, that agreement can
function as an express acknowledgement that the corporation and the gov-
ernment are working together with common interests, and not entirely as
adversaries. Although commentators might argue that corporations and the
government are always complete adversaries, the explicit acknowledgement
that the parties are working together to achieve a mutually beneficial goal
should be given some credulity. The argument that the parties to a confiden-
tiality agreement have some diverging motives should not overshadow the
motives they have which harmonize. The issue is simply not that
straightforward.
Confidentiality agreements would also mitigate concerns over the ra-
ther amorphous regulations of the DOJ and SEC. Corporate clients would
not have to weigh the possibility of private litigation consequences against
their understanding of puzzling and flexible administrative procedures,
which might be more indicative of political concerns than the realities of a
securities investigation. Certainty over whether waiver (either direct or ef-
fective under current DOJ policies) could result in private litigation would
122. Id. at 236.
123. Id.
124. ARK. R. EviD. 502(f).
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eliminate the Hobson's choice of the decision whether to waive or not.125
This decision would, accordingly, be more meaningful, as clients could
weigh the consequences of their waiver with more certainty.
Finally, legally enforceable confidentiality agreements would achieve
the intended result selective waiver advocates seek-more efficient and
fruitful government investigations. Like Bank of America, corporate parties
often enter into these confidentiality agreements under the assumption that
courts will honor them.126 Removing the ambiguity of whether a court will
actually be able to enforce a confidentiality agreement allows the govern-
ment to assess the cooperation of the corporation more definitively. Where a
client has assurance that third-party litigants will not be able to discover the
disclosed information, that client's decision to disclose is not clouded by
uncertainty over future civil litigation. The government may give proper
consideration to that decision without considering the possibility that refusal
to waive represents fear of a future lawsuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
If Bank of America is ultimately unsuccessful in its attempt to selec-
tively waive its attorney-client privilege to the SEC, the bank's failure will
be due in part to ambiguous and contradictory federal law. Though the cur-
rently enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502 allows consequence-free dis-
closure to the SEC in some instances, the new rule does not end general
waiver, which remains law in all federal jurisdictions except the Eighth Cir-
cuit. Misunderstandings about federal law can have dire consequences, as
the Bank of America situation shows. Because the bank seems to have mi-
sunderstood that Federal Rule 502 "gives corporations the ability to disclose
privileged documents in a limited way under the terms of a court order, not
a waiver[,]" the bank has-perhaps fatally-misread the law to its future
detriment.127 A drafter of Rule 502 asserts that the documents the bank dis-
closed to the SEC are now "fair game for plaintiffs lawyers in . . . 58 cas-
es."l28 Even if Bank of America's motives in disclosing this information to
the SEC were completely honest, the bank's attempt at selective waiver still
likely will not protect it in subsequent litigation. As the litigation that the
bank's "privileged order" originated from was in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, law of the Second Circuit will
ultimately control interpretations of its attempted "waiver."' 29 Though this
125. See generally Strassberg & Walters, supra note 99.
126. Leone, supra note 2.
127. Lowe, supra note 1.
128. Id.
129. Disclosure Stipulation Agreement and Proposed Protective Order, SEC v. Bank of
Am. Corp., (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 09 Civ. 6829).
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is the circuit that decided Steinhardt, that case counseled against a bright,
line rule only in dicta-the case still adopted the majority's general waiver
rule. 130 This ersatz "waiver" may yet have disastrous results for the bank.
The possibility for a dilemma like Bank of America's in a state court
proceeding makes Arkansas's codification of selective waiver into its state
rules more understandable. Instead of simply introducing "strict" selective
waiver, Arkansas should have specified that corporations could waive the
privilege and protection only pursuant to a confidentiality agreement with
the government. If the state had done so, it could have minimized reliance
on the ill-favored rule of Diversified and introduced a novel approach to the
waiver problem. Instead, Arkansas's Rule 502 simply solidifies the state's
reliance on nebulous policy arguments, doing little to promote debate that
might stimulate comparable change on the federal level. A more moderate
approach would acknowledge the policy concerns raised by both sides of
the debate while conceding the wisdom of reviewing disclosures on a case-
by-case basis, d la Steinhardt. Ignoring this more practical solution makes
Arkansas's choice seem more apprehensive than ground-breaking and might
likely give opponents of selective waiver more fuel for their arguments.
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